Does Anne Conway (1631–79) hold that the created world consists of a single underlying substance? Some have argued that she does; others have argued that she is a priority monist and so holds that there are many created substances, but the whole created world is ontologically prior to each particular creature. Against both of these proposals, this article makes the case for a substance pluralist interpretation of Conway: individual creatures are distinct substances, and the whole created world is not ontologically (...) prior to the individual creatures that compose it. The basic argument for such a view draws on Conway's claims about the freedom and moral responsibility of individual creatures. The pluralist reading is straightforwardly compatible with these claims, while the monistic readings are not. (shrink)

I this paper I give minimal axioms for the ontology of time, especially A-theories and B-theories and I derive philosophically interesting lemmas. The exercise is set-theoretical, defining all notions and indicating assumptions and philosophical points of disagreement, while being easy to translate to other formal expressions . The issue of a logic for A-theories of time is treated towards the end, where I sketch ‘copresent’ operators for capturing the idea of temporal passage. The main conclusion will be that, while circularity (...) threatens both families of theories, the growing block theory (belonging to the A-theory) is the least objectionable philosophically. (shrink)

It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters ‘This is tasty’ and another speaker responds with ‘That’s not true’. The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are not in a position to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which another kind of dissent phrase—like ‘Nuh-uh’—is employed). This is because utterances of ‘That’s not true’ are (...) typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it, however, that when one utters ‘This is tasty’, one typically manifests her evaluative attitude (which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward the thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism when it comes to the explanation of disagreements in which speakers respond with ‘Nuh-uh’ to utterances of ‘This is tasty’, but departs from it in situations in which they respond with ‘That’s not true’. The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty or not. (shrink)

When Gilles Deleuze, in his book on Michel Foucault, asks, ‘who would think of looking for life among the archives?’, he uncovers something particular to Foucault's philosophy, but also to his own: a commitment to the question of what it means to think, and think politically. Although Foucault and Deleuze, who first met in 1952, immediately felt fondness for each other, a growing animosity had settled into the friendship by the end of the 1970s – a rift deepened by theoretical (...) differences. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Foucault and Deleuze shared a love for Nietzsche, as well as a curious fascination with Kant. Kant's influence, which was met with more opposition, is precisely the tension I tease out in this article, showing how Foucault critiques Kant's a priori through his own concept of the historical a priori, along with regularity and resistance, while Deleuze and Guattari, if more obliquely, critique Kant's a priori by further developing Foucault's notion of the historical a priori through their own method of pragmatics, particularly in three chapters of A Thousand Plateaus, namely ‘The Geology of Morals’, ‘Postulates of Linguistics’ and ‘On Several Regimes of Signs’. What I am interested in, then, is Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of redundancy, a concept mentioned seventy times in A Thousand Plateaus. Although not one of their main or most developed concepts, redundancy is a thread that can be traced back to Deleuze's first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity. Moreover, their more developed concepts, for example the diagram, the abstract machine, becoming, micro-politics and the ritornello, as well as their political philosophy, are grounded in their understanding of redundancy, which moves their philosophy beyond mapping out the conditions of possibility and demonstrating that the historical a priori emerges as a contingent function of its own expression to the genesis of thought. (shrink)

Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...) nature of introspection, I will argue that our internal mental lives share enough commonalities with experiences in our environment to warrant this extension. I will demonstrate the value of introspective affordances by showing how they allow us to explain an underexplored aspect of thought insertion. (shrink)

I aim to develop a tool for comparing theories of vagueness, using Structured Query Language. Relevant SQL snippets will be used throughout.

Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify (...) it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance. (shrink)

This paper is about how to interpret and evaluate purported evidence for predicativism about proper names. I aim to point out some underappreciated thorny issues and to offer both predicativists and non-predicativists some advice about how best to pursue their respective projects. I hope to establish three related claims: that non-predicativists have to posit relatively exotic, though not entirely implausible, polysemic mechanisms to capture the range of data that predicativists have introduced ; that neither referentialism nor extant versions of predicativism (...) can offer a very plausible account of the interpretive possibilities for singular unmodified definite descriptions containing names ; and that the most plausible version of predicativism would treat bare names as non-anaphoric definite descriptions. (shrink)

Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.

No livro I da Ethica Eudemia, Aristóteles dedica um capítulo a considerações acerca de seu método. No entanto, analisando passagens de outros tratados do autor, é possível concluir que há algo comum que perpassa as diversas considerações acerca de seu método, a saber: que o ponto de partida de toda investigação é dado pelo que é mais cognoscível a nós, e todo o procedimento de investigação visa chegar ao que é mais cognoscível em si mesmo – o conhecimento estrito do (...) objeto, que inclui compreender suas causas. O objetivo deste trabalho é tentar compreender como esse procedimento acontece na investigação moral, que opera no âmbito do discurso e, portanto, das definições. Para isso, pretendemos analisar como acontece a passagem da análise do que é dado na experiência em direção ao conhecimento de suas causas, que é próprio de outros tratados aristotélicos, para a análise das opiniões vagas e imprecisas em direção às definições estritas com as quais a Ethica Eudemia pretende operar. (shrink)

Touch is standardly taken to be a proximal sense, principally constituted by capacities to detect proximal pressure and thermal stimulation, and contrasted with the distal senses of vision and audition. It has, however, recently been argued that the scope of touch extends beyond proximal perception; touch can connect us to distal objects. Hence touch generally should be thought of as a connection sense. In this paper, I argue that whereas pressure perception is a connection sense, thermal perception is not. Thermal (...) perception is a proximal sense distinct from touch. One significant consequence of this is that it motivates an alternative explanation of how we detect the thermal properties of the things we touch and what they are. (shrink)

The neo-liberal upsurge of the last twenty years and the neo-liberal case against the welfare state has gained much of its emotional force from a sub-text which is highly gendered. Whereas social liberalism had contained the promise of more autonomy within the private sphere and more caring values in the public sphere, neo-liberalism depicts the results of social liberalism as a loss of self reliance – through ‘over-protection’ by the state in the public sphere and usurpation of male roles in (...) the private sphere. The identification of the welfare state as female (the ‘nanny state’) helps fuel resentment on the part of those already confused by rapidly changing gender roles. This paper tracks the sex change which took place in the image of the liberal state as it evolved out of the night watchman state – the link between the women's suffrage movement and social regulation, maternal principles of distribution and demands for the public organization of caring. It examines the neo-liberal rejection of the breast and neo-liberal claims that the maternal state is incompatible with ‘self-reliance’ and a barrier to competitiveness in the world market. (shrink)

Bell-type inequalities are proven using oversimplified probabilistic models and/or counterfactual definiteness (CFD). If setting-dependent variables describing measuring instruments are correctly introduced, none of these inequalities may be proven. In spite of this, a belief in a mysterious quantum nonlocality is not fading. Computer simulations of Bell tests allow people to study the different ways in which the experimental data might have been created. They also allow for the generation of various counterfactual experiments’ outcomes, such as repeated or simultaneous measurements performed (...) in different settings on the same “photon-pair”, and so forth. They allow for the reinforcing or relaxing of CFD compliance and/or for studying the impact of various “photon identification procedures”, mimicking those used in real experiments. Data samples consistent with quantum predictions may be generated by using a specific setting-dependent identification procedure. It reflects the active role of instruments during the measurement process. Each of the setting-dependent data samples are consistent with specific setting-dependent probabilistic models which may not be deduced using non-contextual local realistic or stochastic hidden variables. In this paper, we will be discussing the results of these simulations. Since the data samples are generated in a locally causal way, these simulations provide additional strong arguments for closing the door on quantum nonlocality. (shrink)

Contextuality and entanglement are valuable resources for quantum computing and quantum information. Bell inequalities are used to certify entanglement; thus, it is important to understand why and how they are violated. Quantum mechanics and behavioural sciences teach us that random variables ‘measuring’ the same content (the answer to the same Yes or No question) may vary, if ‘measured’ jointly with other random variables. Alice’s and Bob’s raw data confirm Einsteinian non-signaling, but setting dependent experimental protocols are used to create samples (...) of coupled pairs of distant ±1 outcomes and to estimate correlations.Marginal expectations, estimated using these final samples, depend on distant settings. Therefore,a system of random variables ‘measured’ in Bell tests is inconsistently connected and it should be analyzed using a Contextuality- by-Default approach, what is done for the first time in this paper.The violation of Bell inequalities and inconsistent connectedness may be explained using a contextual locally causal probabilistic model in which setting dependent variables describing measuring instruments are correctly incorporated. We prove that this model does not restrict experimenters` freedom of choice which is a prerequisite of science. Contextuality seems to be the rule and not an exception; thus, it should be carefully tested. (shrink)

Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious challenge: in many languages names normally occur as, what appear to be, grammatical arguments. The standard version of predicativism answers this challenge by positing an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences. I argue that this is a mistake. Predicativists should draw a distinction between two kinds of semantic type—underived semantic type and derived semantic type. The predicativist thesis concerns the underived semantic type of proper names and underdetermines a (...) view about the semantic type of bare occurrences. I’ll argue that predicativists should hold that bare names are derived individual-denoting expressions. I end by considering what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names. (shrink)

This paper explores spatial justice in urban environments through immersive art and design, focusing on Amsterdam and Houston. It presents a case study from the Venice Biennale 2023, showcasing art's potential in fostering inclusive urban spaces. The study delves into the socio-political complexities of urban areas, highlighting often-ignored liminal spaces and their tensions and possibilities. Immersive art emerges as a transformative medium, capable of challenging and reshaping perceptions of space, and addressing systemic socio-economic disparities. Adopting a transdisciplinary approach, the research (...) combines insights from various fields to enrich discussions on spatial justice and inspire urban transformations. By examining liminal spaces and the 'phygital' nexus, the paper challenges conventional urban narratives and advocates for more inclusive and equitable urban strategies. (shrink)

Among the virtues of relationist approaches to Frege’s puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness of sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few pay-offs. It allows us to shed light (...) on recent controversies about the ‘essential indexical’, and it also allows us to see what’s at stake between relationists and their opponents. When we see what’s at stake, we can see that we have reason to adopt an account of cognitive significance that incorporates elements of both relationist and Fregean approaches. (shrink)

The PhD thesis advances a new approach to vagueness as dispersion, comparing it with the main philosophical theories of vagueness in the analytic tradition.

Recent experiments allowed concluding that Bell-type inequalities are indeed violated thus it is important to understand what it means and how can we explain the existence of strong correlations between outcomes of distant measurements. Do we have to announce that: Einstein was wrong, Nature is nonlocal and nonlocal correlations are produced due to the quantum magic and emerge, somehow, from outside space-time? Fortunately such conclusions are unfounded because if supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments are correctly incorporated in a theoretical model (...) then Bell-type inequalities may not be proven .We construct a simple probabilistic model explaining these correlations in a locally causal way. In our model measurement outcomes are neither predetermined nor produced in irreducibly random way. We explain in detail why, contrary to the general belief; an introduction of setting dependent parameters does not restrict experimenters’ freedom of choice. Since the violation of Bell-type inequalities does not allow concluding that Nature is nonlocal and that quantum theory is complete thus the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate may not be closed. The continuation of this debate is not only important for a better understanding of Nature but also for various practical applications of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

An exploration of the legacy of Michael Servetus to the development of a new type of theological inquiry which ultimately helped lead to the development of critical biblical studies.

In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Spinoza argues that an individual’s natural right extends as far as their power. Subsequently, in the Tractatus Politicus (TP), he offers a revised argument for the same conclusion. Here I offer an account of the reasons for the revision. In both arguments, an individual’s natural right derives from God’s natural right. However, the TTP argument hinges on the claim that each individual is part of the whole of nature (totius naturae), and for this reason inherits (...) part of the natural right of that whole. Using several analogous cases from the Ethics, I show that this form of argument from division is not compatible with Spinoza’s considered metaphysical views. The revised argument, by contrast, avoids the pitfalls of his earlier efforts. It also better reveals the deep roots by which the monistic metaphysics of the Ethics feeds into Spinoza’s conception of natural right. (shrink)

Frege's Puzzle is a founding problem in analytic philosophy. It lies at the intersection of central topics in the philosophy of language and mind: the theory of reference, the nature of propositional attitudes, the nature of semantic theorizing, the relation between semantics and pragmatics, etc. This chapter is an overview of the puzzle and of the space of contemporary approaches to it.

A constant of Frege’s writing is his rejection of indeterminate predicates as found in natural language. This paper follows Frege’s remarks on vagueness from the early "Begriffsschrift” to his mature works, drawing brief parallels with the main contemporary theories of vagueness. I critically examine Frege’s arguments for the inconsistency of natural language and argue that the inability to accommodate vagueness in his mature ontology is mainly due to heuristic rules of thumb which Frege took as essential, not to a deep (...) problem in his fundamental apparatus. (shrink)

The paper aims to weaken a widespread argument against indexical contextualism regarding matters of personal taste. According to indexical contextualism, an utterance of “T is tasty” (where T is an object of taste) expresses the proposition that T is tasty for J (where J is a judge). This argument suggests that indexical contextualism cannot do justice to our disagreement intuitions regarding typical disputes about personal taste because it has to treat conversations in which one speaker utters “T is tasty” and (...) another responds with “T is not tasty” (referred to as ‘judge-non-specific conversations’ in this paper) as being on a par with conversations in which one speaker utters “T is tasty to me” and another responds with “T is not tasty to me” (referred to as ‘judge-specific conversations’). The argument has it that judge-specific conversations, unlike judge-non-specific conversations, do not contain disagreement between speakers. To defend indexical contextualism, some philosophers have proposed accounts (here referred to as ‘dual-proposition theories’) according to which utterances of “T is tasty” are used to communicate both the above kinds of semantically expressed proposition and some other kinds of proposition (like superiority propositions or metalinguistic propositions) that could be used to explain disagreements about taste. The paper defends two claims: First, it is argued that judge-specific conversations, or at least some of them, do contain disagreement between speakers, contrary to what the anti-indexical-contextualist argument supposes. Second, it is argued that dual-proposition indexical-contextualist theories fail to explain judge-specific conversations that are intuitively interpreted as containing disagreement. (shrink)

Anne Conway rejects the view that creatures are essentially members of any natural kind more specific than the kind 'creature'. That is, she rejects essentialism about species membership. This chapter provides an analysis of one of Anne Conway's arguments against such essentialism, which (as I argue) is drawn from metaethical rather than metaphysical premises. In her view, if a creature's species or kind were inscribed in its essence, that essence would constitute a limit on the creature's potential to participate in (...) the divine good. It is this consideration that ultimately leads her to reject essentialism about species membership. The chapter concludes with an examination of some of the metaethical consequences of Conway's view as well as a lesson it can teach us about ideal adviser accounts of the good. (shrink)

There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...) the first factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional ‘proto-hypothesis’ and how a ‘proto-hypothesis’ in consort with normal experiences and background information, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's own, and that this requirement of identification is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion, auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis. (shrink)

Tasks, tools, and techniques that we perform, use, and acquire, define the elements of expertise which we value as the hallmarks of goal-driven behavior. Somehow, the creation of tools enables us to define new tasks, or is it that the envisioning of new tasks drives us to invent new tools? Or maybe it is that new tools engender new techniques which then result in new tasks? This jumble of issues will be explored and discussed in this diverse collection of papers. (...) Individually, few of the papers are related to each other by topic or by techniques of analysis. Collectively, all focus on tasks performed using tools and discuss the techniques of tool use which enable differences in performance and expertise across individuals, societies, and (even) species. -/- . (shrink)

Cieľom state je navrhnúť systematickú a vyčerpávajúcu klasifikáciu definícií. Táto klasifikácia vychádza z typológie, ktorú vypracoval Richard Robinson vo svojej knihe o definíciách, no v rôznych aspektoch ju ďalej dopracováva. Nová klasifikácia je založená na dvoch kritériách, a to kritériu predmetnosti a kritériu ilokučnej sily. Podľa kritéria predmetnosti možno definovať výrazy, pojmy, resp. objekty ; podľa kritéria ilokučnej sily možno zase rozlíšiť definície, ktoré opisujú existujúci systém, a definície, ktoré transformujú daný systém na nový systém. Napokon sa podľa týchto dvoch (...) kritérií vyhodnocujú niektoré známe druhy definícií. (shrink)

In lecture III of Naming and Necessity, Kripke extends his claim that names are non-descriptive to natural kind terms, and in so doing includes a brief supporting discussion of terms for natural phenomena, in particular the terms ‘light’ and ‘heat’. Whilst natural kind terms continue to feature centrally in the recent literature, natural phenomenon terms have barely figured. The purpose of the present paper is to show how the apparent similarities between natural kind terms and the natural phenomenon terms on (...) which Kripke focuses are outweighed by more significant differences. Thus, rather than providing additional support for non-descriptivism, natural phenomenon terms turn out to challenge that thesis. (shrink)

Nicholas Agar, Jeff McMahan and Allen Buchanan have all expressed concerns about enhancing humans far outside the species-typical range. They argue radically enhanced beings will be entitled to greater and more beneficial treatment through an enhanced moral status, or a stronger claim to basic rights. I challenge these claims by first arguing that emerging technologies will likely give the enhanced direct control over their mental states. The lack of control we currently exhibit over our mental lives greatly contributes to our (...) sense of vulnerability. I then argue moral status should be viewed in terms of vulnerability. The enhanced will slowly gain the ability to command their mental states, reducing their vulnerability. These radically enhanced beings will have greater capacities, and possibly an inner life more valuable than our own. They will also be less vulnerable, and as a result, their moral status will be subordinate to our own. (shrink)

Bell-CHSH inequalities are trivial algebraic properties satisfied by each line of an Nx4 spreadsheet containing ±1 entries, thus it is surprising that their violation in some experiments allows us to speculate about the existence of non-local influences in nature and casts doubt on the existence of the objective external physical reality. Such speculations are rooted in incorrect interpretations of quantum mechanics and in a failure of local realistic hidden variable models to reproduce quantum predictions for spin polarization correlation experiments (SPCE). (...) In these models, one uses a counterfactual joint probability distribution of only pairwise measurable random variables (A, A′, B, B′) to prove Bell-CHSH inequalities. In SPCE, Alice and Bob, using 4 incompatible pairs of experimental settings, estimate imperfect correlations between clicks registered by their detectors. Clicks announce the detection of photons and are coded by ±1. Expectations of corresponding random variables—E (AB), E (AB′), E (A′B), and E (A′B′)—are estimated and compared with quantum predictions. These estimates significantly violate CHSH inequalities. Since variables (A, A′) and (B, B′) cannot be measured jointly, neither Nx4 spreadsheets nor a joint probability distribution of (A, A′, B, B′) exist, thus Bell-CHSH inequalities may not be derived. Nevertheless, imperfect correlations between clicks in SPCE may be explained in a locally causal way, if contextual setting-dependent parameters describing measuring instruments are correctly included in the description. The violation of Bell-CHSH inequalities may not therefore justify the existence of a spooky action at the distance, super-determinism, or speculations that an electron can be both here and a meter away at the same time. In this paper we review and rephrase several arguments proving that such conclusions are unfounded. Entangled photon pairs cannot be described as pairs of socks nor as pairs of fair dice producing in each trial perfectly correlated outcomes. Thus, the violation of inequalities confirms only that the measurement outcomes and ‘the fate of photons’ are not predetermined before the experiment is done. It does not allow for doubt regarding the objective existence of atoms, electrons, and other invisible elementary particles which are the building blocks of the visible world around us. (shrink)

There are few notions in philosophy seen more clearly, and in parallel so laden with confusion, than that of space and time. The subjective nature of analyses is most likely to blame. As it stands, a universal agreement has not yet been reached. My position is simply that the mind, when passive, has no qualms with space and time itself, nor is it concerned with its principles. It is only when our passions are ignited, and our judgment is utilized, i.e. (...) when we begin to actively think about space and time, that the notion becomes confounded. Any further digression into semantics of the issue by trying to give a ‘say all end all’ explanation will always lead to a dead end. Both space and time are ideas of an infinite nature and can never be visited manifestly since the mind itself is undeniably finite. (shrink)

Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...) hence, according to Segal (1997), it should be understood as involving an extra module. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. After outlining how both theories can explain the manifestation of the nine alleged properties of modularity in synaesthesia, I discuss the two concepts of function which initially motivate the respective theories. I argue that only a teleological concept of function is properly able to adjudicate between the two theories. The upshot is a further application of so-called externalist considerations to mental phenomena. (shrink)

According to Tye's PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptual states of creatures which are related to a disjunction of external contents will fail to represent sensorily, and thereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I argue that heat perception, a form of perception neglected in the recent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tye's radical externalist claim. Having laid out Tye's absent qualia scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derives and the case of heat perception as a counterexample, (...) I defend the putative counterexample against three possible responses: (1) that heat perception represents general (i.e. non-disjunctive) intrinsic properties of objects, (2) that heat perception represents the non-specific heat energy that is transferred between a subject's body and another body and (3) that heat perception exclusively represents heat properties of the subjects own body. (shrink)

The advent and widespread adoption of modern technology has impacted our society in a significant and ubiquitous manner. I argue that our dependence on modern technology, specifically, has prompted a loss of human autonomy that corresponds directly to its advancement. I argue that this anti-reciprocal phenomenon is self-instituted. In this sense, autonomy is not lost like ones wallet or car keys, but rather handed over to modern technology in exchange for the streamlined processes and conveniences it promises. -/- I arrive (...) at this conclusion through exploring the research and findings of other thinkers situated in the field of philosophy of technology and the analyses made by other contemporary authors. I also provide my own analysis incorporating relevant phenomena that serve to validate and solidify my arguments. -/- For as much talk of technology that comes part and parcel with a work of this nature, I suggest something quite divergent from its leading critics. It is true that modern technology impacts nearly every aspect of our lives today, and in many ways, its influence defines the very way we have evolved as a society. In its use, there can be seen a wide spectrum of advocacy from philia to phobia and everything between. Yet, I recognize that the one common factor in the invention, adoption, advancement, and widespread utilization of modern technology is a human inventor, adopter, advancer, and end user. It is my contention that the blame can rest not in a thing for the phenomenon of human dependence and loss of autonomy. To truly understand the way modern technology affects us, we must look upon ourselves. (shrink)

In this chapter I shall examine some of Johann Georg Hamann’s claims about how philosophers misuse, misunderstand, and are misled by language. I will then examine how he anticipates things that Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein say on this topic.

This chapter investigates Spinoza's conception of reason, focusing on (i) the difference between reason and the imagination, and (ii) the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. The central interpretive debate this chapter considers is about the scope of rational cognition. Some commentators have argued that it is only possible to have rational cognition of properties that are universally shared, whereas intuitive knowledge may grasp the essences of particular individuals. Another prominent interpretation is that reason differs from intuition only in virtue (...) of its form or manner of apprehension, and not in virtue of the content or ideas it apprehends. However, authors on both sides of the debate have held that reason is incapable of grasping singular things. After summarizing the debate, this chapter presents an argument that Spinozan reason is not blind to particulars: it is (at least sometimes) capable of grasping the causal structure that characterizes an individual. (shrink)

In todays advanced society, there is rising concern for data privacy and the diminution thereof on the internet. I argue from the position that for one to enjoy privacy, one must be able to effectively exercise autonomous action. I offer in this paper a survey of the many ways in which persons autonomy is severely limited due to a variety of privacy invasions that come not only through the use of modern technological apparatuses, but as well simply by existing in (...) an advanced technological society. I conclude that regarding the majority of persons whose privacy is violated, such a violations are actually initiated and upheld by the users of modern technology themselves, and that ultimately, most disruptions of privacy that occur are self-levied. (shrink)

What does it mean for an object to persist through time? Consider the statement, ‘My car is filthy, I need to wash it.’ Consider the response, ‘How did it get that way?’ The answer is that dirt, dust and other particles have collected on the car’s surface thus making it filthy. Its properties have changed. At one point in the car’s career, none of that dirt and grime existed on its surface and the car was said to be clean. The (...) fact is that for a car to get dirty, the extension of time is necessary. The standard view of identity is that each thing is entirely itself at any given time. So how can an object remain identical with itself over time, if it changes its properties? In many ways I have different properties now than those I had last week. But if I am different, how then can I be the same? The objective of this article is to answer the question of what it means to say that we and other things persist through time. First I’ll lay out two popular philosophical views of persistence through time, then I will present possible problems with both views. After that, I will outline another possible answer that lies outside of these views. Finally, I will providemy own answer. (shrink)

The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster of properties (...) without taking stock of the metaphysical picture used to account for that stability. Thus, even on the stable property cluster account, the epistemic value of natural kinds remains partly grounded in their metaphysical status. (shrink)

The ongoing explosion of interest in artificial intelligence is fueled in part by recently developed techniques in machine learning. Those techniques allow automated systems to process huge amounts of data, utilizing mathematical methods that depart from traditional statistical approaches, and resulting in impressive advancements in our ability to make predictions and uncover correlations across a host of interesting domains. But as is now widely discussed, the way that those systems arrive at their outputs is often opaque, even to the experts (...) who design and deploy them. Is it morally problematic to make use of opaque automated methods when making high-stakes decisions, like whether to issue a loan to an applicant, or whether to approve a parole request? Many scholars answer in the affirmative. However, there is no widely accepted explanation for why transparent systems are morally preferable to opaque systems. We argue that the use of automated decision-making systems sometimes violates duties of consideration that are owed by decision-makers to decision-subjects, duties that are both epistemic and practical in character. Violations of that kind generate a weighty consideration against the use of opaque decision systems. In the course of defending our approach, we show that it is able to address three major challenges sometimes leveled against attempts to defend the moral import of transparency in automated decision-making. (shrink)